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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
KARL L. BADGER,
-vs.-

Plaintiff and Apellant,

PAUL TAYLOR CLAYSON,

Case
No.10517

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for personal
injury and property damage resulting from an automobile accident which occurred at a blind intersection controlled by a semaphore signal.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial jury on special interrogatories and acting
on instructions of the court below found the defendant
11egligent in running a red semaphore but also found the
plaintiff negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout, whereupor, the court entered judgment of ''No
Cause of Action." Plaintiff's motion for new trial was
<leniecl.

•

2

RELIEF SOUGH'l.1 ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and jmlgment in his favor as a matter of law on the liability issue
and a new trial on the issue of damages or, that failing,
a new trial on all issues of the case.
STATEl\lENT OF FACTS
The controversy which is the subject of this lawsuit
arises out of a re~atively simple fact situation. Plaintiff and defendant were operating automobiles which
collided at the intersection of 4500 South and 1300 East
Streets in Salt Lake County at approximately 8 :00 a.m.
on December 30, 1963. Immediately prior to the collision plaintiff was traveling east 011 4500 South Street and
defendant was traveling south on 1300 East Street. 'l'he
accident occurred during daylight hours and the atmosphere was clear and the road surface was dry. Because
of topographic and other conditions at the intersection,
neither driver could see in the direction from ~which the
other was approaching until his automobile was almost
into the intersection. Traffic at the intersection is controlled by a semaphore signal.
Conditions at the intersection are illustrated by several photographs received in evidence (Exhibits P 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 and Exhibit D 9). The intersection is
"blind" as to the corresponding views of vehicles approaching from the west and north herause 1300 East
Street drops off abruptly to the 11orth of 4500 South
Street leaving a dirt embankment betwPen approaching

3
vehicles. There are also some trees, telephone poles and
shrubbery located near the intersection. The defendant
explained the visibility as follows: (R. 238)
'' Q. As you approach this intersection coming
south, can you see 45th South to the west?
A. When you are on 13th East traveling south,
it's difficult to see 4500 South until you are practically right on it.

Q. Docs it start to come into your view as you
come up that hill~
A. -Well, you have got to be almost immediately
on it before you can sec the 4500 South any distance west.''
and (R. 243)

'' Q. You are very familiar with the intersection
are you'?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And it is your judgment that you couldn't see
a car any distance west on 45th South until you
got almost into the intersection. Is that correct!
A. That is correct.
Q. And you didn't see this other car at all until
just a moment before the impact?
A. That is correct.''
The plaintiff, Mr. Badger, who was also familiar with
the intersection was in doubt as to whether or not a vehirle approaching from the west could see a south-bound
automobile when the latter was right at the intersection
next to the telephone poles located at the corner (R.
217). The evidence discloses that neither driver saw
the other until just before the impact (R. 218, 243).
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The principal liability issue involved determination of which driver had the green light in his favor.
There was little conflict in the testimony with respect to
the other issues.
Plaintiff testified that he was returning to his home
at the time of the accident. He said that he slowed as he
approached the intersection and that when he was about
120 to 125 feet west of the intersection the light turned
green and he proceeded into the intersection at a speed
of approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour (R. 141).
The defendant was on his way to work at the time
of the accident. When he first saw the light it was green
for southbound traffic. He recalls having seen the light
about a block ( 600 feet) north of the intersection (R.
243-244). From this point he traveled at a constant speed
of approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour to the point of
impact (R. 244). He testified on direct examination
that the light "turned from green to orange" just before he entered the intersection (R. 171). On cross-examination he could not say for sure whether or not he
actually saw the light change ( R. 246).
Other witnesses who testified on the liability issue
included the investigating officer, a foreman for the Salt
Lake County Street Lighting Department and two eye
witnesses, Paules Peterson and Pieter Klein.
The investigating officer established the point of impact of the vehicles and testified that no brakes were
applied by either vehicle. He also established from the
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physical evidence at the accident scene that the Buick
automobile driven by the defendant was involved in a
col1ision with two other vehicles near the crosswalk on
the south side of the intersection after the initial impact
·with plaintiff's automobile. He further testified that
he observed the operation of the semaphore light after
he arrived at the scene of the accident for about 20 to
25 minutes and that the light was working normally
(R. 83). He testified that the light remained on amber
for G to 6 seconds as timed by the sweep hand of his
watch (R. 86).
The Salt Lake County Lighting Department Foreman, Armond Myers, testified with respect to time intervals of the various lights of the semaphore. He testified
that the amber light for north~south traffic was displayed
for a period of 5 seconds (R. 103). An exhibit kept by
Mr. Myers in the ordinary course of his business and received in evidence discloses that the interval for the green
light controlling north-south traffic was 14 seconds (Exhibit P-2).
Pieter Klein, testified that just prior to the accident
he had been traveling north on 1300 East Street in a
Dodge automobile. He intended to make a left turn at
the intersection of 4500 South and as he approached the
intersection he was traveling at a speed of approximately
20 miles per hour (R. 117-118). When he was about 100
feet back from the intersection the light turned yellow
ancl he made a "slow stop" which he estimated cons urned approximately 7 seconds (R. 117-118, 119). Klein
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stopped his automobile next to the pedestrian lane at the
intersection. When he was about 20 feet from the crosswalk he saw defendant's automobile straight ahead of
him and approximately 200 feet north of the intersection (R. 119-120). Klein testified that the Buick automobile traveled at a constant speed from the time he first
saw it until it entered the intersection at a speed of
approximately 35 miles per hour and collided with the
plaintiff's automobilee (R. 120).
The other eye witness, Paules Peterson, had been traveling north in a Chevrolet truck behind the Klein automobile. He was driving his truck at a speed of approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour when he saw the
light change to yellow (R. 132). Peterson could see that
Klein ·was going to make a left turn and since Peterson
intended to proceed directly on through the intersection
he turned to the right of the Dodge automobile and made
a "slow stop" (R. 132). Peterson estimated that it took
10 to 15 seconds for him to stop his vehicle after he
saw the light turn yellow ( R. 132). Peterson saw the
vehicles collide in the iutersection hut he did not know
exactly where his vehicle was when the defendant's automobile entered the intersection.
The plaintiff was thrown out of his automobile by
the impact and sustained severe personal injuries as a
result of which he wil1 be permanently disabled to a substantial extent and will probably require a shoulder
fusion which will render his shoulder joint completely
immobile (R. 185). The gravity of the injury is aggra-
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vatec1 by the fact that plaintiff does not have a normal
right arm. Plaintiff also sustained substantial damages
for loHt wages plus medical expense of approximately
$1,600 and property damage of approximately $1,500.
'rhe court submitted the cau8e to the jurors on a speeial verdict which requirecl them to determine specificall>'
as to each driver "What negligent acts proximately
cause(l the collision" (R. 52). In instructing on the law
of the case the court fully aclvised the jury on the motorist's duty with respect to semaphore signals and also
~~·an' a specific instruction with respect to lookout for
otlH'r vehicles. In the latter instance the court instructf'(l the jury by his Instruction No. 17 that there is a duty
imposed on a driver of an automobile "to be awarP of
tl1c relative positions and speeds of vehicles approaching and he must recurrently reohscrve and reappraise in
the light of the consistent changing conditions of a fluid
traffic situation" (R. 46).
The jury was out for deliberations (interrupted only
h~, the mealtime recess) for approximately 6 hours (R.
234, 265). By their special verdict the jury unanimously
<ldcrmined that the defendant had run the red light and
by a six to two verdict the jury determined that the plaintiff had failed to keep a "proper lookout" (R. 52. See
also R. 265-266). Judgment of "No Cause of Action"
\\'as cnterrd on the special verdict and the plaintiff's
motion for iww trial was denied (R. 53, 56). This appeal
follo\\'ecl.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 17 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF HAD AN ABSOLUTE DUTY AS HE
APPROACHED THE INTERSECTION TO
OBSERVE OTHER VEHICLES APPROACHING, ENTERING AND CROSSING THE INTERSECTION AND TO CONTINUALLY
REAPPRAISE THE SPEEDS, DISTANCES
AND RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE
OTHER VEHICLES [EVEN THOUGH
PLAINTIFF WAS PROCEEDING WITH
THE GREENLIGHTAND COULD NOT SEE
APPROACHING VEHICLES BECAUSE OF
THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE INTERSECTION].
The instruction of which plaintiff here complains
reads in its entirety as follows:
"Instruction No. 17
You are instructed that even though the opera tor of an automobile has the right-of-way, he still
has the duty to keep and to maintain a reasonable,
proper, and adequate lookout and to use reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a collision. One
who has the right of way must use due care while
crossing and must continue to keep a reasonable
lookout and reappraise the situation as he approaches an intersection and use reasonable and
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid
a collision as he proceeds.
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There is imposed upon a driver the duty to be
aware of the relative positions and speeds of vehicles approaching and he must recurrently reobserve a;nd reappraise in the light of the consistent changing conditions of a fluid traffic situation. Therefore, even if you should find from
the evidence in this case that either driver had
the technical right-of-way, you should also consider that such right-of-way is a relative right
only, and if he was careless in failing to keep and
continue to keep a reasonable and adequate lookout or failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary
care under the circumstances to avoid a collision
and that such negligence, if any, proximately contributed in any substantial degree to cause the
collision, he would be negligent.'' (Emphasis
added.)
The importance of the instruction is manifest since
plaintiff was denied recovery on the basis of the jury's
interpretation of what constituted a "proper lookout"
under the law of the case (special verdict R. 52). By the
instruction complained of the court specifically instructed the jury what reasonable care required, to wit: that
''there is imposed upon a driver the duty to be aware
of the rel,ative positions and speeds of vehicles approaching and he must recurrently reobserve and reappraise in the light of the consistent changing conditions of
a fluid traffic situation."
Plaintiff took due exception to the instruction contending in substance that the instruction nullified the
"reasonable care" standard and would be tantamount to
a directed verdict against plaintiff because it would be
impossible for plaintiff to be aware of the changing
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position of defendant's automobile as plaintiff approached the intersection (R. 255-256).
In order to discharge the duty imposed by Instruction No. 17 a motorist approaching a blind intersection
is required as a matter of law to accomplish the impossible feat of seeing approaching vehicles which cannot be
seen because of physical terrain or in the alternative to
slow or stop his vehicle at the intersection where he can
see other approaching vehicles and, if necessary, stop
before entering the intersection even though he enters on
a green light.
The instruction is erroneous because it imposes an
absolute duty to be aware of other vehicles instead of a
duty of reasonable care to observe and also because under
the circumstances of this case the duty imposed was impossible to comply with unless possibly plaintiff had
stopped at the intersection and looked up and dmvn the
cross street for approaching vehicles.
The duty to see another vehicle approaching an intersection is not absolute even where the terrain is such
that one can be seen and there is no traffic control sign
or signal at the intersection. This principal is established in Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747
(1952). The Martin case involved a collision at an open
intersection. Plaintiff had the right of way. The trial
court refused to permit plaintiff's case to go to the jury
on the theory that plaintiff had a duty as a matter of lavv
to see defendant·~ automobile approaching and that his
failure to see the defendant's vehicle sooner than he did
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was negligence as a matter of law. On appeal defendant's counsel contended that an open intersection collision will not occur unless hoth drivers are negligent and
fail to see each other. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the contention that plaintiff had an absolute
duty to see defendant's vehicle. In so holding the Court
said:
"No matter how far afield one may go in reviewing, analyzing and rationalizing the decisions in
these intersection cases, he must always come back
to the one basic concept which underlies and controls the Law of Torts: The conduct of the mythical but extremely useful 'ordinary reasonable prudent man under the circumstances,' all of which is
encompassed in the shorter phrase 'due care.' "
''That iR the standard we apply to the plaintiff.
Admittedly, the right of way is not absolute. One
who has it, under one or both of the aforementioned rules may not, with foolhardy assurance,
claim the right of way in the face of danger which
one exercising due care would see and avoid. Although plaintiff had the right of way under both
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon
him the duty of due care in observing for other
traffic. But in doing so he had the right to assume, and to rely and act on the assumption that
others would do like·wise; he was not obliged to anticipate either that other drivers would drive negligently, nor fail to accord him his right of way,
until in the exercise of due care, he observed, or
should han' observed, something to warn him that
the other driver was driving negligently or would
fail to accord him his right of way. If this principle is not clear in the earlier Utah cases, it is
firmly established by the more recent expressions
of this court.''
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In Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510,
plaintiff was traveling on an arterial highway. Defendant's ambulance approached from a cross street and ran
a stop sign. There were no obstructions to vision of
the intersection and the court instructed that both parties
were negligent as a matter of law. The issue of proximate cause was submitted to the jury and a verdict for
plaintiff was sustained on appeal. The Supreme Court
was eYenly divided as to whether or not plaintiff was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law in not looking
for traffic approaching the arterial highway. (The fifth
judge concurred in the result.) Justice ·wolfe's opinion
analyzed the situation as follows:
"In the first place, the trial court was distinctly
in error in instructing the jur>' that the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law ...
The [trial] court may have been misled by our
case of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, !18 P. 2d
350. But the facts of that case were far different
from those in this case. In that case there was no
stop sign - no designation of arterial highway ...

"In this case the plaintiff was in ]aw in no such
position. Whether he could have ascertained from
a view up 31st Street that the driver of the ambulance was not going to stop or at what point
he could have so ascertained it, if he could have
done so at all, until it was too late to stop, is
strictly, under the facts of this case, for the jury.
He was on an arterial. He could rely on the ambulance stopping before he reached the intersection until he was or should have been definitely
aware that it was not going to do so. At that time
he may ha Ye been well out in the intersection. Onl>"
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at that point did his duty to stop or accelerate
his speed - viz. attempt to avoid the accident,
begin. Only then if he had not acted as a prudent
man would have acted under the circumstances
would he be guilty of contributory negligence. And
even at that point if defendant thrust upon him
the necessity of exercising a quick choice of action the jury should take that factor of emergency
judgment into account in determining whether he
was contributorily negligent.
''Thus, the court was in error in instructing the
jury that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of
law.''
Even where a motorist's view is such that he can see
approaching vehicles the duty to be aware of such vehicles is not in many cases an absolute duty, as illustrated
by the foregoing decisions. Certainly where there are
obstructions to view or as in this case a total blocking of
the view the duty of reasonable care caonnot be held to
require as a matter of law that the motorist "be aware"
of approaching vehicles.
Further, where the motorist has the right of way beC'ause he is proceeding with the green light, the right to
assume non-negligence distinguishes the lookout duty
from the ordinary open intersection case. See e.g. Hess
v. Robinson, supra; Youngblood v. Robison, 239 La. 338,
118 So. 2d 1431, Annotation at 2 ALR 3rd 12.
Instruction No. 17 appears to be tailored from a portion of the language of the court's opinion in the case of
Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514. The "duty
to be aware of the relative positions and speeds of ve-
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hicles approaching" and the duty to "recurrently reohserve arnl reappraise" mm;t be considered in light of
the facts involved in the Hickok case. Plaintiff in that
case actually saw the defendant's automobile one-half
block away hut did not look again in the direction of defendant's automobile until the time of impact. 'rhe court
in the Hickok case held that the plaintiff having testified
that he s:rw defendant's automobile and was uninformed
as to its speed and having failed to avail himself of an
ample opportunity to look again in the direction of defendant's approaching automohile and reappraise its
relatiYe position was guilty of negligence. It is rea(lily
apparent that the (luty to "be aware of approaching automobiles" and to "rcobserve mid reapriraise" while
appropriate under the facts of the Hickok case, have no
application to the facts of the case at bar where the circumstances were such that the moto1·ist conlcl not see approaching Yehicles until he was at thP intersection. The
instruction as applied to the facts of the case at bar is
clearly an trroneous statement of the law.
The prejudicial effect of Instrnction No. 17 is most
obvious. It must be presnme<l that the jury fo11owcr1
the instruction in determining the issne of lookout. Under the circnmstances of this case the instruction cor:1pelled the jury to find tlrnt the plaintiff did not keep a
"proper lookont" lwca use lte ·was not nware of clefenclant 's approaching antomohik and clicl not see it until
just a moment before the impact. Plnintiff was deprind
of recover;r solel>· on the basis of thr jury's finding- "-ith
respect to lookont. N otwitlrntarnfoig the eno110011s in-
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struction two jurors dissented to the finding. In fairness
and justice the judgment cannot be permitted to stand
iu the face of such patent error.

POINT II
THE .JURY FINDING ON PROXIMATE
CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
AND CONTRARY TO THE LAW UNDER
'rHE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
AND THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiff was denied recovery in this cause on the
basis of the jury's finding that he was negligent in failing to observe a "proper lookout" and that such was a
proximate cause of the collision. It is asserted under
Point I of this Brief that the jury was erroneously instructed with respect to the plaintiff's duty to maintain
a lookout. It is respectfully submitted, however, that in
any event a failure to maintain a proper lookout on the
part of plaintiff could not have been a proximate cause
of the collision.
It is significant that the jury did not find plaintiff
negligent in any particular except as to lookout. Since
question number one of the special verdict required the
jury to determine specifically "what negligent acts proximately caused the collision" the absence of a finding of
negligence except on the issue of lookout necessarily determines that plaintiff was not negligent in driving at an
excessive rate of speed, failing to slow down as he ap-
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proached the intersection, failing to keep his car under
proper control, entering against the semaphore, failure
to yield the right of way, or in any other particular. On
the other hand, the jury expressly found that the defendant was in the intersection ·when the light was reel
and that this constituted negligence \Vhich was a proximate cause of the accident. In other words, it must he
assumed from the special findings of the jury that plaintiff entered on the green semaphore at a reasonable rate
of speed and with his Yehicle under proper control, but
that he clid not maintain the lookout which the court required under its instructions to the jury. A lack of diligence in maintaining a lookout could not possibly have
been the eause of the accident for reasons presently to
be demonstrated.
Failure to keep a proper lookout is not the proximate
cause of an accident unless the driver hy maintaining a
proper lookout could have avoided the accident. A case
illustrating this principle of Jaw is Morris v. Christensen,
11 Utah 2d 140, 356 P. 2d 34. In the Morris case the
plaintiff was proceedings through an intersection on a
green light and failed to see the defcndm1t 's automobile approaching on the cross street until just before the
impact. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the trial
judge had reasonably and properly concluded that plaintiff's observation of approaching traffic would not han'
forewarned him of the impending hazard and that a failure to keep a proper lookout under such cirrumstances
was not a proximate cause of the collision. In so holding the court ennneiatecl. the rule of proximate eansP
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which applies to the facts of the case at bar:

"It is the duty of a driver to observe and to see
what there is to see so as to be able to exercise
ordinary precaution to prevent collisions such as
this. This duty extends to the favored driver with
the right of way as well as to the disfavored
driver. But he who has the right of way need
not anticipate sudden outbursts of negligence on
the part of another driver. Indeed, it may be said
that the failure to observe is negligence proximately contributing to the harm orily where by obsen:ing the driver could have avoided or lessened
the resulting harm." (Emphasis added.)

In the case at bar plaintiff had no opportunity to
avoid the collision after he could have first seen the def end ant's automobile proceeding into the intersection.
Each driver acknowledged that the other motorist's vehicle could not be seen until the drivers were almost into
the intersection. The photographs received in evidence
corroborate the testimony in this particular. The collision occurred when plaintiff's vehicle was only 11 feet
and defendant's vehicle was only 29 feet into the intersection. (Pedestrian lanes were 10 feet back from the
rurb and point of impact was 21 feet 3 inches and 39 feet
4 inches from pedestrian lanes. See R. 77-80 and Exhibit
1. At 25 miles per hour plaintiff was traveling 36 feet
per second, and the defendant at 30 miles per hour was
traveling 44 feet per second. The ordinary stopping distance for an automobile traveling at the rate of 25 miles
per hour with allowance for reaction time is 59 feet.
·when plaintiff was 59 feet from the point of impact
(which was 48 feet from the west edge of the intersec-
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tion), the defendant's automobile had to be at least 72
feet from the point of impact ·which was 43 feet from the
north edge of the intersection. [This is computed by determining the time interval requireu for plaintiff to travel 59 feet at 36 feet per second and determining how far
defendant would travel in that interval at 44 feet per
second.]
Even if plaintiff's reaction had been perfect and
had he been looking to the left (instead of to the right
or at the semaphore or straight ahead of him, which are
all places where a driver must he looking as he approaches an intersection) at the nry instant defendant's car first became visible it would still han been
totally impossible for the plaintiff to have stopped his
automobile short of the point of impart. rrhis does not
take into account that plaintiff having the light in his
favor had the right to assume that defendant woulcl yield
the right of ·way until in the exercise of due care plaintiff should liaYe known to the contrary.
'l'hus plaintiff, after first seeing the def endaut 's automobile, would have to determine that defernlant in Yie"·
of his speed and approach "·as not going to yield the right
of way, whereupon plaintiff ·would first become obligated
to take evasive action. After first recognizing danger
and before plaintiff could take any evasin' action ·whatever the ordinary interval for reaction time ( % second)
would allow his car to move 27 feet. This is obYiously
why neither driver had a chance to apply his brakes or
turn his vehicle before the collision nnu "·h~· eaeh s~rn-
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the other only a split second before the collision. The
mathematics are such that neither could have seen the
other even a full second before the collision.
It is thus submitted that at the time of plaintiff's
first opportunity to observe the other vehicle there was
nothing plaintiff could do to avoid the accident and that
a failure to keep a proper lookout could not have possibly been the proximate cause of the accident. Morris
Y. Christensen, supra.

POINT III.
THE VERDICT IS FATALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY.
By its verdict the jury has found that plaintiff was
guilty of negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout,
but that defendant was not guilty of negligence in this
particular. Since the rights and duties with respect to
lookout are reciprocal (except to the extent that plaintiff as the favored driver had the right to assume that
other traffic would yield to his vehicles) it cannot be said
with reason that defendant maintained a proper lookout
hnt that plaintiff did not.
The testimony of each driver was that he did not see
the other automobile until just a moment before the impact, and each testified that traffic on the cross street
could not be seen until the motorist was almost into the
intersection. [Actually neither driver's neglect in maintaining a lookout could possibly have been a proximate
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cause of the accident.] It may be argued with reason
that the jury's tacit finding that defendant was not guilty
of proximal negligence in failing to maintain a proper
lookout is necessarily a finding that plaintiff could not
have been guilty of negligence in this particular. The
jury's finding that one driver was negligent with respect
to lookout and that another was not under identical circumstances demonstrates a total lack of comprehension
on the part of the jury with respect to the duty to maintain a lookout and nullifies the validity of the finding on
the issue of lookout.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted for the reasons heretofore stated that the court incorrectly instru0ted the
jury on the issue of lookout; that the court's instruction
was so framed that it constituted, if followed by the jury,
a directed verdict against plaintiff; that under the evidence plaintiff's failure to maintain a lookout could not
have been a proximate cause of the collision, and that
the jnry 's finding on the issue of lookout is nullified by
a patent error in the application of reciprocal duties between the drivers involved. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the jury having found negligence on the part of
defendant which was a proximate cause of the collision,
and it having been demonstrated under the evidence and
as a matter of ]aw that the failure of the plaintiff to
maintain a proper lookout could not have been a proximate cause of the accident, that plaintiff is entit1N1 to
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judgment on the issue of liability and the cause should
be remanded for trial on the issues of damages only. In
the event the court fails to reverse and remand for trial
on the damages issue alone, then the cause should be remanded for new trial on all issues of the case.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR •

.Attorneys for .Appellant

